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Abstract 
This article discusses some observations in the forensic accounting-based fraud 
literature. We identify recent advances in the literature and highlight several important 
issues that are worth noting. The main message of this commentary article is that fraud 
is complicated, and fraud complexity can significantly impact the way we undertake 
forensic accounting-based fraud research. The practical implication is that forensic 
accountants and forensic accounting researchers should incorporate into their 
practice the complexity of fraud regardless of whether they follow an empirical, 
experimental, exploratory, analytical or critical approach to fraud investigation. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the Association of Chartered Fraud Examiners (ACFE), fraud is defined as 
“the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or 
misapplication of the organization's resources or assets.” Fraud has implications for 
investors, firm owners, regulators, auditors and the public around the world (Albrecht 
et al, 2008). Accounting (or financial) fraud has played a major role in the failure of many 
financial and non-financial institutions around the world. The negative publicity from 
the media to firms that commit fraud continue to pose serious concern for the integrity 
of the audit profession and other supervisory bodies across several industries and puts 
pressure on fraud researchers to suggest solutions to deal with corporate and public 
fraud. Fraud research can provide answers to some but not all questions regarding the 
complexity of fraudulent behaviour by individuals and organisations.  
One approach to understand the issues regarding fraud complexity is to begin from the 
simple issues to the complex ones. Accordingly, we highlight some factors that led to 
the growth in the fraud and forensic accounting literature, and also identify notable 
advances in the literature and the challenges that fraud pose to academic research and 
corporate practice and finally we suggest some direction for future research. 
We commend prior review articles that examine fraud and forensic accounting 
practices, skills and certifications, and the need for forensic accounting education (e.g. 
Rezaee, 2002; Crumbley, 2009; Rezaee and Burton, 1997; Sharma and Panigrahi, 2013; 
Ozili, 2015, etc.). Building on these articles, this commentary article elaborates on some 
fraud themes in the forensic accounting literature that academics and practitioners 
may find useful; and the remarks, issues and directions for future research we provide 
in this commentary are not intended to be comprehensive but instead are limited to 
issues in the literature that we find to be particularly significant. While fraud is widely 
examined across several disciplines including the computing, business ethics and 
forensic science disciplines, fraud research in the field of forensic accounting is 
relatively emerging.  
Our study focusses on fraud research in the forensic accounting literature which is our 
main contribution to the literature. This commentary contributes to the forensic 
accounting literature on fraud research by identifying pertinent issues that academics 
and practitioners should take into account in their evaluation of the incidence of 
corporate fraud in their forensic accounting analyses or practices. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 present factors that led to 
significant growth in the literature. Section 3 present some advances in the literature. 
Section 4 briefly identifies some challenges and proposes some possible direction for 
further research. Section 5 provides some concluding remark. 
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2. Growth in the Fraud and Forensic Accounting Literature 
Forensic accounting and fraud research has grown over the past two decades. One 
factor that contributed to the growth in fraud research was the collapse of large US 
companies that engaged in fraudulent accounting-based corporate governance 
practices such as Enron, WorldCom and Tyco, including a Big-5 audit firm Arthur 
Anderson (Rezaee, 2004; Ball, 2009; Huber, 2012). Interestingly, a Big 5 audit firm, Arthur 
Anderson, helped Enron commit accounting fraud. In search for huge profits, Arthur 
Anderson played down its high audit standards while seeking huge profits and as a 
result faced the consequences of its actions. Subsequently, several fraud revelations 
emerged during the period which has changed the corporate governance structure of 
firms around the world in recent years, which also led to greater demand for the 
services of forensic accountants and fraud investigators.  
Another factor that encouraged the growth in forensic accounting research is the lack 
of in-depth forensic accounting education in the accounting curriculum in tertiary 
institutions compared to the greater emphasis and importance placed on other 
accounting topics in the accounting curriculum. Two decades ago, forensic accounting 
education was almost non-existent in the accounting syllabus of many tertiary 
institutions while much emphasis was placed on financial accounting, management 
accounting and auditing education. Rezaee (2002), Crumbley (2009) and Ozili (2015) 
provide an extensive review on forensic accounting education.  
Another factor that encouraged the growth in forensic and fraud research is lack of 
confidence among investors about the reliability of information disclosed in the 
financial reports of large and complex organizations. The more complex the operations 
of large firms, the more difficult it is to detect financial and non-financial fraud once it 
has been committed, and the greater the need for the services of forensic accountants 
or investigators to help companies expose fraud hidden in accounting numbers and to 
trace fraud to the perpetrator. 
Another factor is the growing number of white collar fraud committed by top executives 
of companies (Zahra et al, 2005). The increasing awareness that senior managers 
withhold information or give misleading information to obtain monetary benefits has 
been a motivation for studies investigating employee and top management fraud 
(Daboub et al, 1995), and this issue remain a highly debated topic today.  
Another factor is the failure and inadequacy of internal auditing systems to detect top 
management fraud in firms (Sharma and Panigrahi, 2013). Another factor is the 
imperfection of the audit process. Because auditing is imperfect, there is the argument 
that the analytical procedures employed by auditors to detect unusual trends in 
financial ratios are often ineffective, and auditors’ awareness of the ineffectiveness of 
these procedures have increased their over-reliance on management explanations to 
affirm the reliability of financial statement estimates (see. Anderson and Koonce, 1995; 
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Hirst and Koonce, 1996; Bierstaker et al, 1999; Erickson et al, 2000; Bell et al, 2005). Also, 
more recently, there are growing concern that firms that engage in complex activities 
or sell complex products, such as investment banks, have substantial amount of 
information about the products they offer but disclose little information about their 
products to their clients, thereby misleading clients to enter into a transaction with little 
information and then claim that the client had a choice to opt out of the transaction if they 
felt they had insufficient information regarding the terms of the contract underlying the 
transaction. For instance, US firms such as Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, J.P Morgan to 
mention a few, were guilty of this behaviour and had to make out-of-court settlements 
to clients which they misled (see SEC report, 2015)1, and the prevalence of such 
practices has also motivated fraud research in recent years. A final factor motivating 
forensic accounting research is the availability of financial data for firms that have some 
fraud history. The availability of data on fraud history makes it possible to verify and 
compare findings in the empirical literature. Data of firms that have a fraud history may 
be obtained directly from financial statements, or indirectly from SEC filings, third-
party data providers and from other sources. 
 
3. Advances in Forensic and Fraud Research  
Recent advances in forensic accounting or fraud research may be divided into two broad 
categories. The first category focuses on fraud detection and prevention techniques by 
advocating the need for increased forensic accounting education among tertiary 
institutions. An extensive literature focus on forensic accounting education (e.g. Rezaee 
2002; Crumbley, 2009; Ozili, 2015). The second category focus on fraud detection and 
prevention techniques by empirically investigating the financial report of firms that 
have a fraud history to observe whether unusual financial reporting patterns or trends 
can be detected.  
It is important to stress that although fraud research is a wide and multidisciplinary 
literature, fraud research is not the same as forensic accounting research. Forensic 
accounting research investigates how accounting and non-accounting tools are 
employed to detect fraud patterns in the financial statements of companies and the 
effectiveness of such tools while fraud research on the other hand focus on the study of 
fraud motivations, types of fraud, the contexts in which fraud exist, institutional factors 
that encourage or discourage fraud, etc.  
3.1. Fraud Terminology 
One notable progress in the literature is the richness of fraud definition. There is no 
generally agreed definition of fraud in the literature; however, there are informative 
keywords or terminologies that are associated with the definition of fraud. For instance: 
                                                          
1 http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml 
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fraud is an ‘intentional’, ‘deliberate’, ‘purposeful act’, ‘omission’, ‘disclosure of less 
information’, ‘misrepresentation’, ‘non-disclosure of relevant information’, ‘to disguise’, 
‘cheat’, ‘mislead investors’ and ‘deceive firm owners, regulators, and stakeholders’ 
(Rezaee, 2005; Apostolou et al, 2000; Ozkul and Pamukcu, 2012; Ozili, 2015; etc.). These 
informative keywords have been used to describe fraud which is broadly an attempt by 
individuals, employees and firm managers to obtain pecuniary benefits that would not 
be obtained without taking such actions (Zahra et al, 2005; Ozili, 2015). 
3.2. Attribute of Fraudsters 
Traditional forms of fraud include embezzlement, insider trading, self-dealing, lying, 
non-disclosure of information corruption, and cover-ups (e.g. Moberg, 1997). Today, the 
way fraud is being perpetuated is changing due to the emergence of sophisticated 
technologies (i.e., techniques and tools) which fraudsters can exploit to hide every trace 
of fraud, therefore, it makes sense to say that the propensity or likelihood of individuals 
to commit fraud is positively related to available sophisticated technologies or self-
constructed systems that help fraudsters to get away with fraud or to hide fraud traces.  
Another issue is the attribute that fraudsters possess. Academics and practitioners 
have not reached a consensus on the characteristics or attributes of fraudsters. 
Nonetheless, there appear to be some consensus among practitioners that fraudsters 
may be divided into two groups: the ‘greater good oriented fraudster’ and ‘the scheming, 
self-centred fraudster’ (Ramamoorti, 2008; Brody et al, 2012). The greater good 
oriented fraudsters are honest individuals who intentionally misrepresent financial 
numbers and justify their actions by claiming that their action is in the best interest of 
the company while the scheming and self-centred fraudster misrepresent financial 
numbers for their personal interests rather than in the company’s interest. 
3.3. Fraud Motivators and Inhibitors 
Also, several factors within firms have been identified to encourage fraud such as weak 
corporate governance structure in firms (see. Beasley, 1996; Abbott et al, 2000; Beasley 
et al, 2000; Farber, 2005; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Ramaswamy, 2005, Ozili and 
Uadiale, 2017, etc), misappropriation of assets (see. Omar et al, 2016), high executive 
compensation incentives (see. Johnson et al, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; 
Efendi et al, 2007; Peng and Röell, 2008), weak internal control systems (see. Bell and 
Carcello, 2000), corporate lobbying (see. McCarten et al, 2016) and lack of funding to 
acquire sophisticated fraud detection tools (see. Ernst & Young, 2010). Regarding lack of 
funding, substantial funding cuts in the fight against fraud can compel auditors and 
regulators to choose the least effective tools to help them detect fraud. 
Factors within firms that discourage and prevent fraud include: strong internal 
auditors, enhanced audit committees and improved internal controls (see. Asiedu & 
Deffo, 2017), fraud risk awareness (see. Eutsler et al, 2016), anti-fraud environment 
(see. Fleming et al, 2016), implementing fraud reporting policies, staff job rotation, fraud 
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hotlines and the use of forensic accountants (see. Othman et al, 2015; Ozili, 2015) among 
others. 
3.4. Detecting Fraud 
3.4.1. Non-financial measures 
Non-financial measures, although largely ignored, can be useful in fraud detection. 
Fraud can be detected by identifying unusual trend and pattern in non-financial 
measures of firm performance (e.g. Bell et al, 2005; Brazel et al, 2009). Bell et al (2005) 
point out that some non-financial measures (NFMs) of firm performance are more 
easily manipulated than others and Brazel et al (2009) suggest that NFMs are easily 
manipulated because NFMs may be ignored by auditors who pay much attention to 
financial measures of firm performance. Therefore, it is important for forensic 
accountants and investigators to understand the non-financial measures of firm 
performance that could provide red-flags to detect fraud. 
3.4.2. Data mining 
Data mining techniques can provide positive prospects for fraud detection. Data mining 
involves importing firm data into a computer program or software specifically designed 
to detect unusual trend in data so that the information obtained from such systems or 
software can provide useful tips to identify actual fraud and to identify the perpetrator. 
Data mining techniques are a proven method to identify unusual trends in current and 
past data in large databases (Clayton et al, 2006; Brown et al, 2007) and data mining 
techniques are strongly advocated by forensic scientists, not forensic accountants. 
However, while data mining comes with many advantages, the main disadvantage of 
this approach to auditors and forensic investigators is that the data mining programs or 
software are often expensive to purchase, costly to maintain and may require 
specialised computer skills or knowledge to operationalise such system throughout the 
company. See Ngai et al (2011) for an extensive of review of data mining as a fraud 
detection method. 
3.4.3. Interviews 
Another technique to detect fraud is the use of interviews. Interviews can be used to 
detect fraud and to obtain the admission of guilt by the person(s) accused of committing 
fraud while detailed document reviews may be used to complement interviews (see. 
Miller and Marston, 2006; Clayton, 2006). When fraud has been committed in a firm and 
there is suspicion due to unusual pattern in financial records, the person responsible for 
preparing the financial record is summoned for questioning via interview and such 
questioning can either lead to the admission of guilt or denial of any wrong-doing by the 
individual. Interviews are widely used in empirical fraud research. Empirical fraud 
researchers extensively use interviews to elicit response from interviewees to identify 
fraud and factors associated with fraudulent practices. 
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3.4.4. Stakeholders 
Stakeholders can play a significant role in fraud detection and there is evidence that 
firm stakeholders can detect corporate fraud. Dyck et al (2010) show that firm 
stakeholders are powerful whistle-blowers against fraud and can provide useful 
information to help investigators detect fraud when there are monetary benefits to 
serve as a reward for whistleblowing. This is interesting because external stakeholders 
can reveal fraud that may not be immediately visible to external auditors. Also, to the 
extent that firm stakeholders are market-based institutions, Dyck et al (2006) show that 
market-based institutions can also play a significant role in monitoring firms than 
regulatory-based institutions. 
3.4.5. Skill-set of Forensic Accountants  
Undoubtedly, the skills of the forensic investigator (or accountant) can contribute to any 
fraud detection activity. Boritz et al (2008) and Ozili (2015) demonstrate that the skill-set 
of the forensic accountant is important in the fraud detection process. Bierstaker et al 
(2006) show that while forensic accounting skills can aid the fraud detection process, 
the skill of a forensic accountant can be a least preferred method used by firms to detect 
actual fraud. In fact, Ramazani and Refiie (2010) observe that firms have low perception 
about the relevance of forensic accountants in the corporate structure of the 
organisation. Unsurprisingly, Ernst and Young (2003)’s worldwide fraud survey 
document that only 20% of firms employ the services of forensic accountants, and an 
explanation for this observation is that expert forensic accountants do not have a 
regular function in organisations compared to traditional internal auditors and financial 
(or management) accountant, which makes it difficult to permanently fit forensic 
accountants within the structure of an organisation. In the event of fraud suspicion, 
organisations are more likely to rely on their internal audit function to detect fraud and 
will hire forensic accountants and fraud examiners only as a last resort if the fraud 
detection outcome of the internal audit unit is unsatisfactory to shareholders and 
stakeholders of the organisation. 
Usually, fraud detection skills of forensic accountants are obtained from extensive 
knowledge and training in forensic accounting education and/or practice which 
typically begins with identifying possible red-flags of fraud (Ozkul and Pamukc, 2012; 
Ozili, 2015). Fraud detection skills can also be improved by obtaining sound knowledge 
about how managers manipulate financial statement variables (Dechow et al, 1996; 
Beneish, 1997; Summers and Sweeney, 1998; Lee et al, 1999; Marquardt and Wiedman, 
2004; McVay, 2006). 
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4. Issues 
4.1. Good Data versus Manipulated Data  
One way to empirically test for unusual fraud pattern is to examine the data trend in the 
financial statement of companies that have been indicted with fraud. While this 
approach is common and logical, it is fraught with the problem of “reaction bias”. 
Reaction bias is a situation where actor(s) or firms change their behaviour quickly to 
lessen the perceived consequence of their wrong doing. For instance, a firm indicted 
with fraud allegations can quickly alter and manipulate the records of the company to 
minimise the legal cost arising from their fraudulent behaviour. If firms alter their 
records when they are about to be indicted for fraud, then there will be concerns about 
the credibility of the financial information of the firm when such information is used to 
test for the existence of unusual fraud pattern.  
In the case of corporate fraud, for instance, when a manager realise that a criminal 
lawsuit has been filed against the firm or will be filed against the firm in the near future, 
the manager will consider the possible legal costs. If the manager perceives that the 
legal cost will be too high, the manager will have some incentive to restructure the 
company records, ex-ante, in a way that lowers the legal cost that will be paid than 
would have been paid if the records were not adjusted. This ad-hoc restructuring of 
company records tends to give rise to unusual trends in financial and non-financial 
ratios and estimates in financial reporting before litigation. Therefore, any statistical 
analyses of the records of such firms by the empirical researcher can pick-up or detect 
these unusual trends which are mainly ‘cover-up tactics’ not the actual ‘fraud pattern’ 
the researcher or investigator want to find. These restructured company records in a 
sense reflect ‘manipulated data’, and the empirical researcher may confuse ‘cover-up 
patterns’ with ‘actual fraud patterns’ during statistical analyses, and this kind of 
manipulated data is a serious challenge in fraud research. From an econometric 
standpoint, taking a one or two-year lag of data prior to fraud litigation date can help 
eliminate or reduce the ‘reaction bias’ problem in fraud data when analysing the 
financial statements of firms.  
This problem is also common with the use of interviews because the interviewee can 
provide over-exaggerated or untrue interview-response about a company depending 
on how the company treats the interviewee who may be a current employee that wants 
to defend the company or an employee that was fired who wants to seek revenge 
against the company. Whichever is the case, the interviewee’s response is likely to be 
biased and, in a sense, reflect ‘manipulated truth’ or manipulated information (data). The 
investigator may confuse ‘over-exaggerated or untrue interview-response’ with the 
truth, and this kind of manipulated information often pose a serious challenge in fraud 
research. In reality, because ‘good data’ and ‘manipulated data’ can exist in different 
forms, it can be difficult to understand whether the data used in empirical fraud studies 
is ‘good data’ or ‘manipulated or window-dressed data’. The need for good data. Levitt 
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and Dubner (2005) confirm that one reason why academics know very little about the 
practicalities of fraud is the paucity of good data.  
4.2. Fraud and Morality 
The ability to attach a convincing and moral explanation to justify fraudulent behaviour 
is often the distinct characteristic of the lucky fraudster from the unlucky fraudster. 
Willott et al (2001) show that fraudsters who commit white-collar crime claim that they 
felt justified in committing fraud to save their company, their jobs, and other businesses 
that relied on the survival of the company. Employees that commit fraud to save their 
company are more likely to feel good about their plans to defraud because it is for the 
greater good of oneself and the company, and this potentially explain why the number 
of white-collar fraudsters increases year by year despite employees’ awareness of the 
legal consequences of engaging in fraudulent activities or behaviour. For example, 
bank traders that trade in complex securities and derivative products often take 
irrational actions and conceal relevant information to outperform their counterparties 
in the market in order to obtain massive profits that benefit the company and 
themselves. Another obvious example is the 2008 global financial crisis. At the heart of 
the 2008 global financial crisis, many too-big-to-fail financial institutions deliberately 
stopped lending to other firms that relied on their lending, and this initiated large-scale 
loan default across several businesses that relied on the too-big-to-fail financial 
institutions. The subsequent interrogation of the CEOs of these too-big-to-fail financial 
institutions during the FCIC2 interview panel show that the CEOs believed that their 
action (to stop lending) was intended to serve a greater moral good which was, partly, 
to prevent the entire collapse of their own firm during the crisis. Surprisingly, not a 
single CEO of the too-big-to-fail financial institutions went to jail for failing to lend 
during the crisis, even though it was a clear breach of their contractual obligation to 
lend. The CEOs were vindicated because they provided a moral justification for doing so.  
In a nutshell, if a fraudster believes that committing fraud will fulfil a higher moral good, 
the fraudster will have strong incentive to commit fraud that achieves that moral good. 
At worse, in a court of law, fraudsters that have strong moral intent behind the fraud 
they commit are more likely to receive lesser penalty than fraudster with no convincing 
moral intent. Therefore, the morality of fraud is a concern that academics should not 
ignore in forensic accounting (and fraud) research. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 FCIC denote ‘Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’. The report is available here: 
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310173538/http://www.fcic.gov/report 
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4.3. Fraud and Legality 
Fraud can be perpetuated as a legitimate activity when there is no clear-cut distinction 
between legal and illegal behaviour due to complicated laws and regulations. 
Intelligent or smart fraudsters are more likely to engage in fraudulent activities that are 
intertwined with legitimate activities to take advantage of complicated laws and 
regulations that do not make a clear distinction between legal and illegal behaviour. For 
instance, Brody (2012) notes that when illegal and legal acts occur concurrently, the job 
of the forensic investigator becomes difficult because legal rules are often used by 
fraudsters to justify their illegal and fraudulent behaviour. 
Also, complicated laws that are enacted to protect a group of stakeholders may create 
fraudulent opportunities for another group of stakeholders. Berenson (2003) argue that 
laws and regulations enacted to protect shareholders’ interests can become so 
complicated that they contribute to the growing incidence of top managerial fraud. The 
implication of Berenson (2003)’s argument is that complicated laws and regulations 
that discourage a group of fraudsters can have the unintended consequence of 
encouraging another group of fraudsters that seek to exploit loop-holes in complicated 
laws to commit fraud, and this is an issue that has not been extensively explored in the 
forensic accounting and fraud literature. 
4.4. Fraud Research in Banks 
Many studies investigate forensic accounting and fraud detection practices among 
firms with little focus on banks. Very few studies examine fraud in banks from a forensic 
accounting perspective. For instance, Rahman et al (2014) using surveys show that 
some bankers perceive that software data protection is more effective in dealing with 
bank fraud. One reason for the limited investigation into bank fraud in fraud research is 
due to the opacity of bank activities. The opacity of a bank reflects the opacity of the 
industry to which it belongs. The banking industry is a relatively less transparent 
industry and banks’ financial reporting is less transparent and is poised to remain so for 
a long time (Beatty and Liao, 2014), therefore, the opacity of bank activities is an 
explanation for the paucity of fraud research involving banks. While this explanation 
seems valid, this argument is criticised because it limits the usefulness of forensic 
accounting to the banking sector because if fraud in banks is difficult to detect due to 
opaque bank financial reporting, then it will be more difficult to stop bank fraud perhaps 
until angels become bank managers. 
Moreover, the scant research into bank fraud by forensic accounting (and fraud) 
researchers raise serious concern about the contribution of forensic accounting (and 
fraud) research to banking practice. Banks should not be ignored because the findings 
from non-banking institutions cannot be generalised to banks because banks are 
unique. Rather than ignoring banks, forensic accounting (and fraud) research involving 
banks should be encouraged because the findings from bank-related forensic 
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accounting (and fraud) research can make a valuable contribution to the banking 
literature and to banking practice if it can provide substantial insight to detect fraud in 
banks. While fraud detection in banks is not a straightforward process due to several 
factors that work together to make fraud detection difficult in banks, the contribution of 
forensic accounting to banking practice is very much needed. A fruitful starting point is 
to identify and discuss several factors that contribute to the difficulty of forensic 
accounting practice among banks and financial institutions. 
4.5. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Regarding the morality and legality of fraud discussed in 4.2 and 4.3, some questions 
need to be addressed. For instance, as academics and fraud investigators, what should 
we focus on. Should forensic accounting-based fraud research focus on companies and 
individuals that have been reported and/or indicted for fraud? Or, should we focus on 
individuals and/or companies that have pleaded guilty to fraud claims simply because 
they do not have a convincing moral and legal justification for their actions? Should we 
exclude super-smart individuals and corporate fraudsters that won their fraud inquiry 
panel and escaped prosecution because the fraud they perpetuated served a higher 
moral good? Should we ignore and remain silent about complicated laws and 
regulations that create incentives to commit fraud? We need more answers! Academics 
do not have all the answers, but we can provide some answers. 
Regarding fraud networks, Karwai (2002) report that identifying the causes of fraud is 
difficult because modern-day organisational fraud usually involves a complex web of 
conspiracy and deception that often mask the actual cause of fraud, implying that there 
is a network of fraud or fraud network. To date, there is scant research into fraud 
networks in the forensic accounting literature; therefore, an investigation into fraud 
networks is needed. Moreover, because fraud networks involve social agents, an 
investigation into fraud networks from a sociological agent-based network perspective 
will be useful.  
Finally, future studies can attempt to develop models that can predict firms that are 
more likely to commit fraud before the fraud is committed. Some academics consider 
this to be the holy grail of empirical forensic accounting research. If we can achieve this, 
the knowledge and skills of forensic accountants and investigators will become more 
relevant to industry regulators around the world.  
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5. Concluding Remark 
This article provides a concise commentary on some advances and issues in forensic 
accounting-based fraud research. We observe that academic inquiry into the field of 
fraud research is growing and the knowledge of forensic accounting can support fraud 
detection activities. However, data mining techniques and other tools developed from 
forensic science research has limited usefulness to forensic accounting practice due to 
huge cost, complexity and skill concern. We identified some interesting advances and 
issues in the literature and provide some direction for future research. The issues we 
highlight in this commentary show that fraud is complicated, and fraud complexity can 
significantly influence the empirical and non-empirical findings from forensic 
accounting-based fraud research; therefore, forensic accountants and investigators 
need to incorporate into their practice the complexity of fraud regardless of whether 
they follow an empirical, experimental, exploratory, analytical or critical approach to 
fraud investigation. 
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